Arbiters with guns: the ambiguity of military involvement in civilian disputes in the DR Congo
Abstract
Based on extensive field research in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), this article elucidates the logics, processes and readings surrounding certain 鈥榚xtra-military鈥� practices enacted by the Congolese army, namely the processing of various types of disputes between civilians. Exceeding the boundaries of the domain of 鈥榩ublic security鈥�, such activities are commonly categorised as 鈥榗orruption鈥�. Yet such labelling, founded on a supposed clear-cut public鈥損rivate divide, obscures the underlying processes and logics, in particular the fact that these practices are located on a blurred public鈥損rivate spectrum and result from both civilian demand and military imposition. Furthermore, popular readings of military involvement in civilian disputes are highly ambiguous, simultaneously representing it as 鈥榓bnormal鈥� and 鈥榟armful鈥�, and normalising it as 鈥榤aking sense鈥� 鈥� reflecting the militarised institutional environment and the weakness of civilian authorities in the eastern DR Congo. Strengthening these authorities will be vital for reducing this practice, which has an enkindling effect on the dynamics of conflict and violence.
Citation
Baaz, M.E.; Verweijen, J. Arbiters with guns: the ambiguity of military involvement in civilian disputes in the DR Congo. Third World Quarterly (2014) 35 (5) 803-820. [Special Issue: Corruption in the Aftermath of War] [DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2014.921431]